On Nomological Validity and Auxiliary Assumptions: The Importance of Simultaneously Testing Effects in Social Cognitive Theories Applied to Health Behavior and Some Guidelines. by Hagger, Martin S et al.
UC Merced
UC Merced Previously Published Works
Title
On Nomological Validity and Auxiliary Assumptions: The Importance of Simultaneously 
Testing Effects in Social Cognitive Theories Applied to Health Behavior and Some 
Guidelines.
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3q23w8xv
Journal
Frontiers in psychology, 8
ISSN
1664-1078
Authors
Hagger, Martin S
Gucciardi, Daniel F
Chatzisarantis, Nikos LD
Publication Date
2017
DOI
10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01933
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
fpsyg-08-01933 November 1, 2017 Time: 17:52 # 1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 03 November 2017
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01933
Edited by:
Tim Bogg,
Wayne State University, United States
Reviewed by:
Thomas L. Webb,
University of Sheffield,
United Kingdom
Jill Ann Jacobson,
Queen’s University, Canada
Mark Conner,
University of Leeds, United Kingdom
*Correspondence:
Martin S. Hagger
martin.hagger@curtin.edu.au
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Personality and Social Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 03 July 2017
Accepted: 19 October 2017
Published: 03 November 2017
Citation:
Hagger MS, Gucciardi DF and
Chatzisarantis NLD (2017) On
Nomological Validity and Auxiliary
Assumptions: The Importance
of Simultaneously Testing Effects
in Social Cognitive Theories Applied
to Health Behavior and Some
Guidelines. Front. Psychol. 8:1933.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01933
On Nomological Validity and Auxiliary
Assumptions: The Importance of
Simultaneously Testing Effects in
Social Cognitive Theories Applied to
Health Behavior and Some
Guidelines
Martin S. Hagger1* , Daniel F. Gucciardi2 and Nikos L. D. Chatzisarantis1
1 Health Psychology and Behavioural Medicine Research Group, School of Psychology, Faculty of Health Sciences, Curtin
University, Perth, WA, Australia, 2 School of Physiotherapy and Exercise Science, Faculty of Health Sciences, Curtin
University, Perth, WA, Australia
Tests of social cognitive theories provide informative data on the factors that relate to
health behavior, and the processes and mechanisms involved. In the present article,
we contend that tests of social cognitive theories should adhere to the principles of
nomological validity, defined as the degree to which predictions in a formal theoretical
network are confirmed. We highlight the importance of nomological validity tests to
ensure theory predictions can be disconfirmed through observation. We argue that
researchers should be explicit on the conditions that lead to theory disconfirmation,
and identify any auxiliary assumptions on which theory effects may be conditional. We
contend that few researchers formally test the nomological validity of theories, or outline
conditions that lead to model rejection and the auxiliary assumptions that may explain
findings that run counter to hypotheses, raising potential for ‘falsification evasion.’ We
present a brief analysis of studies (k = 122) testing four key social cognitive theories
in health behavior to illustrate deficiencies in reporting theory tests and evaluations of
nomological validity. Our analysis revealed that few articles report explicit statements
suggesting that their findings support or reject the hypotheses of the theories tested,
even when findings point to rejection. We illustrate the importance of explicit a priori
specification of fundamental theory hypotheses and associated auxiliary assumptions,
and identification of the conditions which would lead to rejection of theory predictions.
We also demonstrate the value of confirmatory analytic techniques, meta-analytic
structural equation modeling, and Bayesian analyses in providing robust converging
evidence for nomological validity. We provide a set of guidelines for researchers on how
to adopt and apply the nomological validity approach to testing health behavior models.
Keywords: nomological validity, predictive validity, falsifiability, path analysis, meta-analysis, replication, auxiliary
assumptions
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INTRODUCTION
Testing the validity of social cognitive models applied to the
prediction of health behavior provides an important evidence
base to inform the development of behavioral interventions
aimed at promoting health behavior (Biddle et al., 2007;
Weinstein, 2007; Leventhal et al., 2008; Schwarzer, 2008; Conner
and Norman, 2015; Sniehotta et al., 2015). Model tests assist
in identifying the manipulable factors that can then be targeted
by behavioral strategies and techniques that form the content
of interventions. Testing the adequacy of models in explaining
health-related outcomes, therefore, has high translational value
(Moss-Morris and Yardley, 2008; Wallace et al., 2014).
Theoretical models in psychology provide representations of
the factors and processes that relate to outcomes of interest.
The models are often complex involving multiple antecedent,
mediator, and outcome variables and proposals for the pattern
of relations among them in a nomological network. The
specification of models in this way is consistent with the Popper’s
(1959) position that social scientists should seek to provide a
comprehensive description of the situational and interpersonal
factors affecting human action. Central to this position is the
requirement that such descriptions are specified in advance of
observation and should be verified or disconfirmed through
rigorous empirical tests. Such an approach requires clear a
priori specification of sets of relations among social cognitive
variables as antecedents, mediators and consequents in the
nomological network followed by subsequent simultaneous tests
of the network. This position was advocated by Cronbach and
Meehl (1955), among others, when proposing the importance of
subjecting theories to strict tests of their nomological validity,
and abandoning the theory or proposing modifications and
subsequent tests in an iterative approach.
Of course, a strict approach to theory falsification and
nomological validity, in the Popperian sense, has been noted
as problematic. Following Popper’s original assertion, Lakatos
(1978) noted that failures to support or confirm a theoretical
prediction, or simultaneous set of predictions in a nomological
network, could be proposed as evidence for the falsification of the
theory. But it could also be attributed to a number of conditions
or assumptions that lie outside the theory which may explain
the failure to support the prediction. These auxiliary assumptions
represent other external conditions that may affect conclusions
about the hypothesized relations among theory variables, if these
conditions are not measured and confirmed directly during the
analysis (Trafimow, 2012). The potential to explain away failures
to falsify theory predictions by auxiliary assumptions renders
absolute deductive falsification impossible: the failure could be
attributed to the theory or auxiliary assumptions. An approach
to deal with this problem is to propose theories that make ‘risky’
predictions, that is, predictions that would be false if the theory
was untrue, and to explicitly state how theoretical predictions are
expected to be affected by auxiliary assumptions (Trafimow, 2012,
2017).
Theory predictions, therefore, should be accompanied by
additional hypotheses or statements representing the auxiliary
assumptions and how they affect predictions. In this way,
falsification is not abandoned, rather strict falsification is
replaced with a more nuanced version: ‘reasonable falsification’
(Trafimow, 2009). On this basis, if risky predictions can be
shown to be incorrect under conditions of proposed auxiliary
assumptions, then the researcher can claim a level of falsifiability
of the theory, bearing in mind the caveat that other auxiliary
assumptions can be proposed. Taken together, conducting
multiple rigorous tests of risky predictions under multiple
auxiliary assumptions will provide converging evidence for
the theory. Accordingly, Trafimow (2009) notes: “Ultimately,
when one decides how much to believe or disbelieve a theory,
the issue is the weight of the evidence, the plausibility of
alternative explanations, presumptions about the validity of
auxiliary assumptions, and so on, rather than conclusive proof
or disproof” (p. 505).
An illustrative example comes from the recent debate on
the ego-depletion effect and the ‘strength’ model of self-control
(Carter and McCullough, 2014; Baumeister and Vohs, 2016;
Hagger and Chatzisarantis, 2016a; Lurquin and Miyake, 2017).
In the strength model, the proposition that: “if people exert effort
on an initial self-control task (antecedent) then performance
on a subsequent self-control task will decline (consequent)” is
predicted to be true. According to Popper (1959), to disconfirm
this proposition the experimenter will need to (i) confirm the
antecedent (the ‘if ’) and so show experimentally that people
exert effort on an initial self-control task and (ii) show that
performance on the second task does not decline (the ‘then’). But
many other factors are known to affect individuals’ willingness
to exert effort in the initial task and these represent auxiliary
assumptions regarding the strength model of self-control (e.g.,
Allom et al., 2016; Dang, 2016; Lee et al., 2016). Consistent with
Lakatos’ (1978) propositions, experiments should be devised to
show (i) disconfirmation when the factors are present and (ii)
confirmation if factors are present. The theory is disconfirmed
if findings of the tests are always inconsistent with theory
until also additional factors or auxiliary assumptions have been
accounted for. Similarly, Trafimow (2009) proposes that “one
must try out all possible combinations of auxiliary assumptions
in conjunction with the theory and show that, in every case,
the resulting prediction cannot be tested, even in principle”
(p. 504). He illustrates his point in tests of the distinction between
attitudinal and normative beliefs in the theory of planned
behavior under different assumptions (Trafimow, 2009). Taken
together, these examples illustrate the importance of accounting
for auxiliary assumptions when testing risky predictions in
theories in psychology.
Extending these arguments, we contend in this article that tests
of social cognitive theories applied in health behavior contexts
have tended to focus on testing predictions of individual relations
within theories, and fail to formally test the validity of the
predictions of theory as a whole. This practice has rendered many
of the tests problematic as means to provide evidence in support
of the predictions of the theory. Such practice has led researchers
to claim support for theoretical predictions, when they have, in
fact, failed to test the theory. As a consequence, such tests do
not contribute to the converging evidence for the validity of
the theory. If one assumes that evidence supporting a theory is
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built on multiple supportive tests over time of its hypothesized
predictions specified a priori, that is, its nomological validity, and
accompanying assumptions, then revealing that many tests fail to
support the theory, under the principle of reasonable falsification,
undermines the strength of the evidence. A further problem is
that researchers have tended to attribute failed tests of individual
predictions within a nomological network to conditions or
variables that lie outside the theory, that is, auxiliary assumptions,
and tended to claim support for the prediction of the theory as
a whole. Such dismissal is problematic from the standpoint of
reasonable falsifiability given that the auxiliary assumptions are
often specified post hoc, nor do they feature in the tests. This
renders the evidence unhelpful in terms of contributing evidence
in support for the predictions of the theory.
In this article we outline how rigorous nomological validity
tests are essential for adequate evaluation of social cognitive
theories applied in the health behavior domain, that researchers
often inadequately specify their predictions and associated
assumptions prior to testing the theories, and, as a result,
the body of evidence supporting social cognitive theories
may be weaker than previously thought. Failure to adequately
specify the sets of hypotheses that comprise a theory, that is,
the nomological network, and the associated conditions that
may affect the predictions, that is, the auxiliary assumptions,
potentially opens the door to ad hoc explanations for findings
that run counter to predictions. Such practice hinders the
progress of scientific inquiry into the factors affecting health
behavior and the associated processes involved. We propose
guidelines for researchers to adopt when testing the nomological
validity of models applied to health behavior research to ensure
appropriate interpretation when testing models and provide
tests that are sufficiently robust to contribute support for, or
disconfirmation of, their models. Adherence to the guidelines
will enable researchers to progress the science of health behavior
through rigorous tests of theories.
PREDICTIVE AND NOMOLOGICAL
VALIDITY
Although frequently unacknowledged, tests of social cognitive
theories applied to health behavior are, in essence, tests of
nomological validity. Many researchers will be familiar with
multiple forms validity in the social sciences, particularly in the
context of establishing the adequacy of psychometric instruments
used to tap psychological constructs in the models. Tests of
methodological validity include face validity (e.g., whether a set of
items of a measure of a psychological construct appear to capture
the essence of the construct), construct validity (e.g., whether
the set of items converge on a single factor that represents the
psychological construct), discriminant validity (e.g., whether the
construct is distinct from other conceptually related constructs),
and concurrent validity (e.g., whether the measure of the
construct is correlated with other like measures of the construct).
Such tests of validity are often considered prerequisites to be
confirmed prior to the testing of substantive hypotheses focusing
on relations between constructs and outcomes of interest, often
related to behavior (Hagger, 2014). Assuming validity evidence of
measures used to tap the component psychological constructs of
models, researchers can then proceed to test predicted relations
among the constructs according to the theory. Predictive and
nomological validity are the forms of validity that pertain to the
testing of proposed relations among constructs in models.
Predictive validity reflects the extent to which a single factor
or variable relates to another variable of interest, either as an
antecedent or consequent. For example, in the domain of health
behavior, a predictive validity test might involve the prediction
that a social cognitive construct predicts a behavioral outcome.
Predictive validity tests should entail precise specification of the
relation between the variables (e.g., directionality, valence) and
boundary conditions (e.g., auxiliary assumptions) a priori, and
be interpreted in light of any additional factors that may affect the
test and the quality of the test. Within the bounds and limitations
of the observation (e.g., validity evidence of the measures, the
representativeness of the sample, statistical power), and based
on a ‘reasonable’ falsification principle (Trafimow, 2009), the
empirical test and its interpretation then represents a single
datum to inform knowledge and theory on the proposed effect.
The complexity of human behavior suggests that two-
variable systems, although informative, are alone insufficient
in accounting for the determinants of health behavior and
necessitate multifactorial, complex explanations. Testing social
cognitive models in health contexts will invariably require the
specification of relations among multiple constructs. Such models
specify multiple relations among variables in a nomological
network, and each relation in the network can be considered a
single predictive validity test between two variables. Nomological
validity is confirmed when all of the relations that comprise the
network are supported in a single, omnibus test of model. Bagozzi
(1981) notes:
“Nomological validity refers to the degree to which predictions
in a formal theoretical network containing a construct of interest
are confirmed. In one sense, the difference between predictive and
nomological validity is one of degree and not kind. Predictive
validity entails the relationship of measures of a variable to a single
antecedent or consequent. Nomological validity, in contrast,
involves many antecedents and/or consequents in a complex
system” (p. 327).
As in the case of predictive validity, tests of the nomological
validity of a model require that the specification of the pattern
of effects among model variables precedes observation. Each
pathway or relation in the model must therefore be specified
precisely and forms part of the overall test of nomological
validity. In such networks, variables can act as antecedents,
consequents, or both. Furthermore, many social cognitive models
applied in health and behavioral medicine contexts aim to
identify the factors that determine behavior and other salient
health-related outcomes (e.g., psychological well-being, quality
of life), as well as the processes and mechanisms involved.
Nomological networks provide the opportunity to specify
patterns of relations among constructs that reflect mechanisms
such as additive (multiple factors explain unique variance in
outcomes), mediation (one or more factors serve to explain or
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transmit the effect of one variable on another), and moderation
(one or more factors change the pattern of the effect of one
factor on another) effects (Perugini, 2005; Michie et al., 2007;
MacKinnon and Luecken, 2008; Hayes, 2013; Chatzisarantis et al.,
2015). There are also opportunities for multiple combinations of
these processes, such as moderated mediation (e.g., the mediated
effect of one variable on another through a third variable is
conditional on a moderator variable) (Wiedemann et al., 2009;
Zhou et al., 2015; Hamilton and Hagger, 2017). The network
will therefore comprise multiple predictions and patterns of
relations among constructs in a model that reflect the researcher’s
expectations as to how the behavioral phenomenon works.
Also consistent with tests of predictive validity, assessments of
nomological networks must stand up to the notion of ‘reasonable’
falsifiability. As a consequence, tests should seek to validate
the nomological network “as a whole” (p. 299) (Cronbach and
Meehl, 1955). That is, all of the a priori specified predictions
proposed in the network must be verified for the test to be
viewed as supporting the network. Failure to find support for
any one prediction within the model should raise doubts over
the nomological validity of the theory represented by the network
and grounds for subsequent modification that would need to be
subjected to further tests.
Of course, as with tests of individual predictions, the
possibility of alternative auxiliary assumptions may be able
to explain the failure of some of the component predictions
of the network, and, therefore, the network itself. However,
such conditions should be specified a priori. The absence
of such specification invites opportunity to explain away
any test by, for example, alternative hypotheses or auxiliary
assumptions, rendering the proposed network unfalsifiable.
Importantly, the tests should incorporate the theory predictions
and the conditions under which the predictions should hold
in accordance with auxiliary assumptions. Such tests might
involve, for example, testing the network under conditions
determined by moderating variables which determine whether
the predictions hold and reflect the auxiliary assumptions which
may be candidate means to explain away failed tests of theory
prediction. Such tests may provide appropriately risky tests of the
network and, if they fail, may point to problems with the network
rather than problems with the auxiliary assumptions (Trafimow,
2012).
USE OF CONFIRMATORY ANALYTIC
APPROACHES IN NOMOLOGICAL
VALIDITY
The advent of confirmatory analyses based on regression and
covariance structures, such as path analysis and structural
equation modeling, has provided researchers with powerful
analytic tools by which to test simultaneously nomological
frameworks specified a priori (Bagozzi, 2010; Hoyle, 2011).
These analytic techniques enable the researcher to specify the
proposed network among factors and then test the adequacy of
the proposed network to explain relations among data collected
on those factors. The analyses provide estimates as to whether
the proposed model fits with the observations through overall
evaluation of model fit and individual tests of each hypothesis
that comprises the network (e.g., direct effects, mediation effects).
To the extent that model fit with the data is adequate and, most
importantly, support is found for each hypothesis stipulated in
the network, the researcher can claim support for nomological
validity. Application of these techniques in psychology has
increased substantially as advanced analytic software with user-
friendly interfaces has facilitated access to the complex analyses
(MacCallum and Austin, 2000).
With great (statistical) power comes great responsibility, so
researchers must utilize these tools appropriately when testing
models applied to the health domain. Specifically, researchers
must pay close attention to the specification of the model and
the associated auxiliary assumptions. The analytic methods allow
researchers to be extremely specific in their predictions and
account for multiple predictions and associated assumptions. The
closer the correspondence between the researcher’s predictions
and the specification of the model to be analyzed the greater
its value in contributing to evidence as a test of the theory.
One of the problems associated with an over-reliance on indices
indicating overall model fit using these approaches is that they
can be somewhat forgiving of theories that do not quite fit
the data (Marsh et al., 2004). A failure to support some of the
pathways may not sufficiently compromise model fit to warrant
rejection, particularly if the test focuses on evaluating difference
from the null rather than a specified size and direction of the
effect. Consistent with calls to focus on effect size rather than
statistical significance and null hypothesis significance testing
(Trafimow and Rice, 2009; Cumming, 2014; Chavalarias et al.,
2016; McShane et al., 2017), researchers would do well to specify
an expected effect size (e.g., a small, medium, or large effect
based on Cohen’s taxonomy of effect sizes), a range of values
for the effect, or the smallest effect size of interest, based on
previous evidence for each prediction within the model tested
(Lakens, 2014). This level of specificity increases the stringency
of test of the nomological network and increases its validity as
a contribution to evidence in support of, or disconfirming, the
model.
FAILURE TO FALSIFY
Although most social cognitive models applied to predict health
behavior and health-related outcomes in health psychology and
behavioral medicine are essentially nomological networks, few
researchers cite nomological validity when testing their models.
In addition, although many researchers utilize the confirmatory
analytic approaches reviewed previously, few adequately specify
all of the predictions within their proposed network a priori,
including relevant auxiliary assumptions, or clarify what would
constitute failure to support the predictions of the theory.
Instead, researchers tend to focus on testing isolated individual
predictions within the network. This focus would be sufficient
if testing those predictions were the sole concern. However, in
many cases, researchers claim to support the predictions of the
theory, even if one or more of the effects in their specified
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network fail to be supported by the data. Researchers tend,
therefore, to adopt an heuristic of minimal sufficiency to evaluate
their models, such that failure to find one effect among many is
considered a relatively trivial ‘failure’ in the face of support for all
others. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the notion of
nomological validity and presents problems for the falsifiability
of model tests. If a researcher dismisses a failure to support one
of the predictions within their nomological network, it presents
a problem for identifying conditions under which the theory
could be falsified. Of course, the researcher could attribute the
failed prediction within the network to an auxiliary assumption.
However, it would be important that the assumptions were
specified a priori if the test is to make a contribution to evidence
in support of, or rejecting, the network. So, opting not to reject
a test of a network in the face of failed support for one or
more of the a priori specified predictions, or specified auxiliary
assumptions, potentially opens up the possibility any model could
be considered acceptable. A related problem is that researchers
may be tempted ‘fit hack’1 that is, to modify their a priori model
though ad hoc inclusion or deletion of paths with the goal of
finding a model that yields goodness-of-fit indices that conform
to guidelines for a well-fitting model. ‘Fit hacking’ compromises
nomological validity tests by capitalizing on chance to find a
well-fitting model.
NOMOLOGICAL VALIDITY TESTS: AN
ILLUSTRATIVE ANALYSIS
We contend that researchers testing social cognitive models in
the health behavior domain do not routinely provide explicit
statements as to whether their data support or refute the
nomological network of the model that is being tested. We also
contend that in some cases researchers have claimed support
for a model comprising multiple predictions when their test has
failed to support one or more predictions, without providing
adequate explanation, due to auxiliary assumptions or otherwise.
To illustrate this expectation, we conducted a brief review of
the research testing four key social cognitive theories in leading
health psychology and behavioral medicine journals. The purpose
of the research was to identify whether researchers testing
the theories provide: (1) statements that they were testing the
specified theory in its generic, unmodified form; (2) specification
of the predictions that comprise nomological network, along with
associated auxiliary assumptions; and (3) report whether or not
their test provided support for, or rejection of, the hypothesized
network. Our analysis is aimed at illustrating the extent to which
researchers in the field provide unclear or inadequate a priori
specification of models to be tested and how this issue affects
interpretation of the test as sufficient evidence to support or
disconfirm models.
Method
We conducted a search of published correlational research
testing four key social cognitive theories (the theory of reasoned
1We thank one of the reviewers for suggesting this term.
action, health belief model, protection motivation theory, the
theory of planned behavior) published in five key outlets in
health psychology and behavioral medicine (Annals of Behavioral
Medicine, British Journal of Health Psychology, Health Psychology,
Journal of Behavioral Medicine, and Psychology and Health)
using the Web of Science database. To keep the analysis
manageable, we restricted our search to a 15-year period
(2002–2016). Search terms and inclusion criteria are provided
in Appendix A. To be eligible for inclusion, studies had
to be empirical articles reporting a test of one of the four
theories in its original core form in a health behavior context.
Studies testing both motivational (e.g., protection motivation,
intention) and behavioral outcomes were included. Studies
testing hypotheses relating to additional variables within the
theory or moderators of theory relations were included provided
tests of the nomological validity of the theory in its core
form were separable from tests of the additional hypotheses or
moderators. Studies testing the theories of reasoned action and
planned behavior were included if they tested the unique effects
of attitudes and subjective norms, and perceived behavioral
control in the case of the theory of planned behavior, on
intentions in a health behavior context. Studies with a follow-
up measure of behavior were included if they tested the
unique effect of intentions on behavior. Studies testing the
health belief model were included if they tested the unique
effects of perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, perceived
benefits, and perceived barriers on intentions or behavior. Studies
testing protection motivation theory included if they tested
unique effects of perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, self-
efficacy/response efficacy, perceived response costs/barriers, and
intention/protection motivation.
We coded whether researchers made an explicit statement of
support or rejection of the theory according to their findings,
and whether they reported findings that were inconsistent with
their tests of the core hypotheses of the theory. Statements
relating to qualified support or that the tests were consistent with
previous research rather than the theory were not considered
affirmation of support or rejection. We noted instances where
researchers found effects that were not statistically significant,
or explicitly labeled as trivial in size, in their tests of the
sets of hypotheses that comprise the theory, which should
signal failed support for the nomological network. We also
coded whether researchers provided an explicitly stated null
hypothesis or criteria that would lead to the failure to support
hypotheses in the proposed network (e.g., finding an effect
in the network considered trivial in size). Many theories
specify indirect or mediated effects, and we coded whether
researchers included tests of the indirect effects in their theory
tests (e.g., indirect effects of appraisals on behavior through
protection motivation in protection motivation theory).
However, including a test of mediation was not specified
as an inclusion criterion. This requirement was considered
too restrictive as many of the studies focused exclusively on
behavioral intention as a dependent variable and did not,
therefore, test mediated effects of the belief-based constructs
(e.g., attitudes, risk perceptions, norms, perceived control) on
behavior. We also coded the target behavior of the studies (some
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studies included multiple samples and multiple behaviors),
whether the key dependent variable was motivational (e.g.,
intention, protection motivation) or behavioral or both, and
any additional variables included in augmented or modified
versions of the theory tests. Full details of coding of study
characteristics are provided in Appendix A (Supplementary
Materials).
Results
Studies identified in the search (k = 407) were screened
initially for duplicates, article type (abstracts were excluded),
and relevance. The remaining studies (k = 275) were subjected
to full-text screening against eligibility criteria. The exclusion
process is summarized in the flow diagram in Appendix B
(Supplementary Materials). A full list of studies included the
final analysis (k = 122) and studies excluded (k = 153)
with reasons for exclusion are provided in Appendices C
and D (Supplementary Materials), respectively. Characteristics
of included studies with key data for analysis are provided
in Appendix E (Supplementary Materials). Ten studies tested
more than one theory leaving the total number of theory tests
at 133.
Of the 133 theory tests, 87 (65.41%) stated that they were
testing the theory of interest in its core form, whereas others
did not claim to test the theory or presented hypotheses
relating to alternative variables or augmented versions of the
theory. Only 39 tests (29.32%) made an explicit statement in
support of (k = 32; 24.06%), or rejecting (k = 7; 5.26%),
the hypotheses of the theory or model, while the remainder
(k = 94; 70.68%) did not include a statement claiming to
support or reject theory predictions on the basis of their data.
Among those claiming to test a theory (k = 87), 50 (57.47%)
did not provide an explicit statement of support for theory
predictions. A substantial number of theory tests (k = 84;
63.15%) reported at least one finding that was contrary to
theory hypotheses. Prominent examples of effects that were
frequently found to be contrary to theory predictions were
effects of perceived severity and susceptibility on intentions
or protection motivation in protection motivation theory, and
effects of subjective norms and perceived behavioral control
on intentions in the theory of planned behavior. Of those
claiming to test a theory (k = 87; 65.41%), 60 (68.97%) reported
at least one finding contrary to theory predictions. We were
particularly interested in claims for theory support among
researchers claiming to test the theory when they reported at
least one finding contrary to its predictions. Among researchers
claiming to test the theory (k = 87), 15 (17.24%) claimed
support for the theory when their data suggested that at least
one prediction within the network was contrary to hypotheses,
whereas 15 (17.24%) claimed support when their data suggested
acceptance, and 7 (8.05%) indicated that the predictions of
the theory should be rejected when their data indicated that
the theory predictions should be rejected. Of the substantial
proportion of theory tests (k = 50; 57.47%) that did not make
a claim of support or rejection, 38 (76.00%) reported at least
one finding contrary to hypotheses. None of the studies stated
a null hypothesis or reported data that would lead to the rejection
of the theory tested. Furthermore, none of the studies included
hypotheses that made explicit reference to effect size. Finally,
only 17 theory tests (14.66%) tested indirect effects in their
analysis.
Discussion
Our analysis illustrates that the majority of authors of included
studies did not make an explicit statement either supporting
or rejecting the predictions of the theory of interest, and
this finding was the case regardless of whether researchers
claimed to test the theory of interest in its original form
or not. This brief review illustrates an important point
when it comes the testing social cognitive theories in health
contexts: explicit statements supporting the predictions
of the theory being tested are not routinely provided. In
addition, a substantial number of researchers reporting findings
contrary to the predictions of the theory being tested do
not make explicit statements rejecting those predictions,
and, in some cases, claimed support for theory predictions
when the data indicated otherwise. From the perspective of
testing for nomological validity, current findings suggest that
researchers, and, by implication, those making decisions on
published research, do not make their claims for support
or rejection of the nomological networks they test explicit.
Exclusion of this detail makes it difficult to ascertain the
researcher’s position as to whether the network of relations
among theory variables being tested is acceptable or should
be rejected and subsequently revised consistent with the
nomological validity approach. In place of explicit statements
of support or rejection, researchers frequently fall back on
qualified statements which are uninformative regarding the
acceptability of the a priori specified network, or is akin
to a posteriori hypothesizing without a priori specification
of the conditions that would lead to the rejection of the
theory (e.g., auxiliary assumptions). For example, researchers
frequently provide qualified statements claiming “partial
support” for the network or that their findings that “are
largely consistent with” previous research, and we have not
been immune to making such statements (Hagger et al.,
2009; Barkoukis and Hagger, 2013). Similarly, researchers
frequently make reference to previous research that reported
similar findings that were contrary to hypotheses to justify
their failure to find the same effect, or cite methodological
limitations or sample-specific idiosyncrasies as explanations.
Surprisingly, few entertain the notion that the network should be
rejected.
The current analysis illustrates the imperative of identifying
the criteria necessary for a nomological validity test to provide
support for the propositions of a theory. The researcher
should, therefore, identify the ‘core’ theory components and
the associated set of relations among the components that
are the minimum required for the test to support, or fail to
support, the theory. Judgments also need to be made as to which
components, and the relations among them, are central or ‘core’
to the theory, and which should be conditional on auxiliary
assumptions. For example, effects of attitudes, subjective norms,
and perceived behavioral control on intentions, and intentions
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on behavior, comprise key hypotheses of the theory of planned
behavior. While these hypotheses may be considered ‘core’ to
the theory, the relative strength or size of the effect of each
component is expected to vary across context. For example,
the effect of subjective norms on intentions is expected to be
stronger in groups that endorse collectivist values, or for co-
operative behaviors like blood donation, and smaller or even zero
in groups endorsing individualist values or behaviors that are
highly personal like exercising alone. As a consequence, finding
a trivial or null effect for subjective norms on intention in a
nomological test of the theory would not lead to a conclusion
that the propositions of the theory should be rejected. However,
it would be imperative to specify the auxiliary assumptions on
which the subjective norm-intention relationship is conditional
in advance, rather than hypothesizing after the fact. Auxiliary
assumptions may apply to other relations in the model, and they
should be subject to auxiliary assumptions specified a priori.
It is also important that the hypotheses conditional on the
auxiliary assumptions are tested systematically in subsequent
tests of the theory. Some hypotheses within nomological tests
may be flagged as ‘core’ to the theory. For example, in the
theory of planned behavior, the effect of intentions on behavior
is considered fundamental (McEachan et al., 2012; Rich et al.,
2015). While such effects may also be subject to auxiliary
assumptions, such assumptions may affect the strength but not
the presence of the effect. Hypotheses relating to fundamental
effects should, therefore, be stated consistent with this prediction.
Current findings indicate that researchers do no routinely pay
close consideration to identifying ‘core’ effects in nomological
validity tests of theories, or specify auxiliary assumptions
affecting theory effects a priori. Such a practice does not lead
to strong evidence to support or reject a theory, and may lead
to post hoc explanations when findings do not conform to
expectations.
Limitations and Conclusion
It is important to note the limitations of the current analysis.
We based our judgements on the presence or absence of
theory effects tested in the studies included in the current
analysis based on the available evidence including statistical
significance, effect size, and the interpretation presented by the
authors. However, this approach does not rule out the possibility
that that decisions regarding the presence of effects may have
been affected by a lack of statistical power or methodological
limitations in the studies. Related to this, none of the articles
specified the size of the component effects or pathways that
comprised the theories tested. Where predictions were specified,
they were almost exclusively in terms of presence or absence
of the effect, and relied on null hypothesis significance tests.
As research evidence testing networks of relations in a social
cognitive theory expands, specification of effects with greater
precision is possible and necessary to advance knowledge on
the true pattern of theory effects, an issue we will return to
later in the section on Bayesian approaches to nomological
validity. It is also important to note that the sample of studies
included in our analysis did not encompass all research on
social cognitive models in health behavior and was restricted to
a relatively narrow 15-year period. The limited breadth of our
literature search was commensurate with the illustrative purpose
of our analysis and we believe it provides a reasonably accurate
depiction of theory-driven research adopting social cognitive
theories in health behavior contexts. Finally, the current analysis
was conducted on research adopting correlational designs, which
have inherent limitations with respect to inference of causality.
However, our approach could also apply to experimental or
intervention studies in which one (or more) variables within
the nomological network was manipulated and effects of the
manipulations on other constructs in the model tested. The
network could be tested by including the manipulated variables
as dummy-coded variables alongside measures of other model
constructs in a path analysis or structural equation model.
In conclusion, our analysis illustrates a pervading problem in
research testing theories in health behavior contexts: researchers
claiming to test theories tend not to state a priori the
hypothesized network of relations among theory constructs and
associated auxiliary assumptions; tend not to state a priori the
conditions that will lead to the tested network being rejected,
and tend not to provide explicit statement of support or
rejection of the predictions of the network based on their
findings.
FUNDAMENTAL VS. EXPLORATORY
PATHWAYS IN NOMOLOGICAL
NETWORKS
Although the strict criteria for nomological validity advocated
by Cronbach and Meehl (1955) provides a framework for the
falsifiability of models, it is recognized as overly restrictive,
not least because failures to support the predictions of a
network could be attributed to the network or to auxiliary
assumptions. Absolute falsifiability is, therefore, unrealistic.
However, nomological networks that make risky predictions
along with diligent specification of auxiliary assumptions make
the potential of ‘reasonable’ falsification possible. But what
about exploratory tests? Sometimes researchers have no a priori
specification of the existence or direction of particular predictions
in a model. Such exploratory tests can be incorporated within
tests of a theory, but should not be specified as part of the
nomological network, and, therefore, should not be involved
in the decision to accept or reject the model based on
a test of its nomological validity. Importantly, exploratory
pathways should also be identified a priori in the same way
that confirmatory pathways fundamental to the nomological
validity tests are specified prior to observation. In doing so,
researchers are able to clearly lay out the criteria used to
determine the validity of a nomological network in subsequent
tests.
Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2016b) suggest that researchers
make the distinction between fundamental and exploratory or
peripheral effects when specifying relations among variables
in a nomological network. Fundamental effects reflect the
hypothesized relations that comprise the formal nomological
network. Empirical support for all of the fundamental relations
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is required in tests for nomological validity, taking into account
any specified auxiliary assumptions. In contrast, exploratory
or peripheral effects are those that are non-essential for the
nomological network as the theory or conceptual basis of
the effect has not been resolved, perhaps due to competing
hypotheses or lack of prior knowledge. Such effects may be
of interest theoretically and testing them may inform future
theorizing and serve as the basis for revised models, but
they serve no role in determining the acceptance or rejection
of the proposed model. Both fundamental and exploratory
pathways are identified, along with any auxiliary assumptions,
a priori consistent with the nomological validity approach.
Thus, when it comes to the interpretation of empirical tests of
nomological validity, it is clear which effects in the network
should be taken into account when making the decision as
to whether the model should be accepted or rejected, and
which effects should be disregarded when making that decision.
This approach enables the researcher to test a proposed
nomological network, but simultaneously test exploratory
hypotheses that may be of theoretical importance, but not
relevant to the proposed model. As Hagger and Chatzisarantis
stress, the a priori specification of all paths in a network is
a condition of this approach, and posteriori formulation of
the model or re-designation of paths as exploratory is to be
avoided.
META-ANALYTIC STRUCTURAL
EQUATION MODELING AND
NOMOLOGICAL VALIDITY
Evaluation of evidential support for the predictions of a
nomological network or its failure should be evaluated in the
context of the quality of the tests on which the evidence
is based. Limitations inherent in empirical studies testing
nomological networks may limit the extent to which the study
stands as sufficient in providing strong evidence for or against
the predictions of the network. For example, studies may be
confined to a narrow group that is insufficiently representative
of the population, or use methods that inadequately capture
constructs of interest or are subject to bias that introduces
variability unattributed to the effects in the tested network.
Such methodological artifacts of sampling and measurement
error provide caveats as to whether tests are sufficient to
make decision on the adequacy of a nomological network.
The limitations in the conduct of empirical tests may cast
doubt on any decision on whether the network should be
accepted or rejected. As a consequence, single tests of a
theory should be interpreted in light of the adequacy of the
methods used, the appropriateness of the sample, and auxiliary
assumptions known or assumed to affect relations in the
network.
There is also potential for chance findings to provide
misleading tests of nomological validity. Researchers have
reported experiencing difficulty in replicating some of the
most influential effects in social psychology (Open Science
Collaboration, 2012; Earp and Trafimow, 2015; Hagger et al.,
2016b). Such findings have been attributed to the tendency
for journal editors to favor research that provides support
for novel effects, even in cases where the study may be
underpowered and the size of effects found are disproportionate
in relation to the sample sizes on which they were tested (Pashler
and Harris, 2012). Such large effects in small underpowered
studies suggest that the findings may have occurred due
to chance and that many more probably null findings are
rejected for publication or suppressed by authors who do
not think they could be published, or, worse still, do not
want them to be published (Hagger and Chatzisarantis, 2014).
As a solution, researchers have advocated the importance of
the replication of findings using identical methods and in
samples that were appropriately powered (Ritchie et al., 2012;
Zwaan, 2014). In the context of nomological validity, multiple
replications of model tests in large, representative samples are
advocated to minimize the potential for false positive tests
of hypotheses within nomological networks occurring due to
chance.
Given the potential for study quality and chance findings
to affect conclusions in tests of nomological validity, we
advocate that confirmatory support for theories in the health
domain and beyond should be based on converging evidence
through multiple, high-powered replications of nomological
validity tests. The tests should adopt valid methods that
are fit-for-purpose in tapping the required constructs and
minimizing sampling and measurement error. This means
that failure to support the nomological network should be
interpreted on the context of the precision and quality of
the data on which the failed test is reliant. A single failed
test of a network is unlikely to be considered sufficient to
abandon a theory, particularly if questions can be raised
over the integrity or validity of the data, but cumulative
evidence with multiple high-quality failed replications
raises uncertainty over the nomological validity of the
theory.
When a sufficient body of evidence is available, the replications
should also be subjected to meta-analytic path analysis or
structural equation modeling, which provides a powerful means
to evaluate the cumulative evidence for the nomological
network while correcting for methodological inadequacies
such as measurement and sampling error (Hagger et al.,
2016a; Cheung and Hong, 2017). A two-stage approach is
advocated in which tests of each relation between constructs
involved in the nomological network are corrected for sampling
error using meta-analysis, and then the model of interest is
tested using the meta-analytically corrected matrix of relations
among the variables. The resultant model represents a test of
nomological validity based on the cumulative evidence from
multiple replications. It represents a robust test in that it
is derived from multiple replications and is corrected for
artifacts that may have led to a researcher making an incorrect
decision as to the acceptance or rejection of the network.
The adoption of this analytic approach is on the rise (e.g.,
Yu et al., 2007; Carraro and Gaudreau, 2013; Hagger et al.,
2016a, 2017; Cheung and Hong, 2017; Credé et al., 2017;
Protogerou et al., 2017). For example, Carraro and Gaudreau
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 November 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1933
fpsyg-08-01933 November 1, 2017 Time: 17:52 # 9
Hagger et al. Nomological Validity
(2013) conducted a meta-analytic path analysis testing a
nomological network in which variables representing planning
for physical activity (action planning and coping planning)
mediated the relation between intentions and physical activity
participation. However, relatively few studies that have adopted
the omnibus testing of theory-based nomological networks
based on cumulative data from meta-analyses. We advocate that
researchers adopt such an approach in future tests of models in
health psychology.
A BAYESIAN APPROACH TO TESTING A
NOMOLOGICAL NETWORK
A limitation of the traditional meta-analytic path analysis
approach to research synthesis is that it requires the availability
of a sufficient body of work before one can quantitatively
assess the cumulative evidence for a nomological network.
Although a meta-analysis can be performed with two primary
studies, statistical power to detect moderate-sized effects in
the network often falls well below 80% when there is
fewer than six primary studies (Borenstein et al., 2009).
Depending on the scholarly interest in a topic, it may
take years for tests of nomological validity to accumulate
and permit a retrospective meta-analysis. Of course, there
may be instances in which a meta-analysis may be planned
prospectively whereby a consortium of researchers work together
in replicating a nomological network with the intention of
statistical synthesis through meta-analysis (Eerland et al.,
2016; Hagger et al., 2016b). Nevertheless, large-scale projects
that involve multiple researchers across several labs are time
consuming and costly, and therefore represent the exception
rather than the rule when it comes to accumulation of
knowledge.
It is often the case that researchers conduct a study
against the backdrop of previous theory or research, yet
prior knowledge of effects in a theory is typically ignored
in frequentist statistics that rely on statistical significance
testing, such that scholars test “the same null hypothesis
over and over again” (van de Schoot et al., 2014) (p. 843).
An alternative approach is offered by Bayesian estimation,
which is growing in use as an analytic method in psychology
(van de Schoot et al., 2017). Bayesian estimation is not
reliant on the existence of a sufficient body of evidence
for statistical synthesis of data testing a theory or a model.
In Bayesian analysis an existing theory or evidence serves
as a starting point to inform the analysis and is updated
with new data (Muthén and Asparouhov, 2012; Zyphur and
Oswald, 2015). Prior knowledge can come from a variety of
sources, including theoretical expectations, expert knowledge,
or evidence from pilot data, individual studies or meta-
analytic estimates (van de Schoot et al., 2014; Zyphur and
Oswald, 2015). When testing a new theory, for example, one
can formally incorporate theoretical predictions regarding the
direction (e.g., effect is positive and therefore ranges between
0 and 1) and magnitude (e.g., low, moderate, large effect) of
the proposed network of relations among theory constructs
into the analyses, consistent with the nomological validity
approach.
From a Bayesian perspective, prior information can be
thought of being situated on a continuum ranging from
substantial uncertainty (non-informative) to a great deal of
certainty (informative) in one’s expectations about the nature
of effects or relations in a theory (Depaoli et al., 2017).
The level of (un)certainty with respect to each hypothesized
effect in a theoretical network is quantified in a probability
distribution, known as a ‘prior,’ which considers a range of
plausible values rather than a specific value for each effect
(van de Schoot et al., 2014; Zyphur and Oswald, 2015).
For example, guided by meta-analytic data, one might expect
the highest plausibility for a standardized effect of variable
X on variable Y in a nomological network to center on
0.40, with values below 0.10 or above 0.70 considered highly
unlikely (i.e., 95% credibility interval). This prior distribution
is combined with new data via Bayes’ theorem to produce
the posterior distribution for the effect that represents an
updated summary of what is known about the effect (Muthén
and Muthén, 2012), akin to an ‘automatic’ meta-analysis
(Zyphur and Oswald, 2015). Continuing with the previous
example, if the combination of prior knowledge with new
data indicates that the effect of X on Y is centered on 0.30
(95% credibility interval = 0.14, 0.46), one may conclude
that there is a 95% likelihood that the true effect ranges
between 0.14 and 0.46. This intuitive interpretation of the
95% interval in Bayesian estimation differs from that of the
frequentist statistics, where it represents the 95% probability that
other unobserved intervals obtained through repeated sampling
would contain the true population parameter (Hoekstra et al.,
2014). Whereas the frequentist approach is focused on the
probability of the data, given a set of assumptions captured
in a statistical model, Bayesian estimation is concerned with
the probability that the predictions of the theory are true,
given the data (Zyphur and Oswald, 2015). Thus, Bayesian
estimation permits inferences to be made about effects within
a theoretical network, which is what many researchers want to
know.
In terms of nomological validity, Bayesian estimation
facilitates tests of the validity of a network of relations of a
theory as well as individual relations (Zyphur and Oswald,
2015). Through posterior predictive checking (Muthén and
Muthén, 2012; Gelman et al., 2013), Bayesian estimation
makes falsification possible via an assessment of the fit
of a model, representing the network of relations in a
theory, to a specific dataset and an understanding of those
aspects of the data that are incongruent with the model
(Gelman et al., 2013). Posterior predictive checking involves
a comparison of the observed versus generated data and
samples of the parameters from the posterior distribution;
taking into consideration both of these sources of uncertainty
is what provides Bayesian analysis with an advantage over
frequentist approaches (Zyphur and Oswald, 2015). To
quantify model fit, the posterior predictive p-value provides
an indication of the proportion of times the posterior
distribution – obtained from the combination of prior
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beliefs and new data – resembles the observed data (van
de Schoot et al., 2014; Zyphur and Oswald, 2015). Values
around 0.50 indicate a well-fitting model, whereas small
values (e.g., p < 0.05) suggest poor model-data fit because
the generated data are more probable than the observed
data (Muthén and Muthén, 2012; Zyphur and Oswald,
2015).
In addition to model fit, examinations of the posterior
distributions permits inferences that are intuitive and relevant
for falsification of nomological validity. When testing a new
theory in the absence of empirical data, for example, one
can directly test and make inferences regarding theoretical
expectations concerning the direction (i.e., positive or inverse)
of the relations among theory constructs. For a positive
effect of a specific relation within a theory, a researcher
might examine the proportion of the a posteriori specified
distribution that falls between standardized values of 0.20 and
1 (or whatever range is considered meaningful within the
context of the theory); if a large proportion existed in this
credibility interval, it would provide support for the expectation
of a meaningful effect. For example, Gucciardi and Jackson
(2015) conducted a two-wave longitudinal study to examine
a theoretical sequence in which basic psychological needs
satisfaction from peer and adults leaders (e.g., coach) determined
athletes’ attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral
control and, in turn, intentions to remain involved in sport.
Perceived behavioral and intentions served as the primary
determinants of sport continuation approximately 12 months
later. Both empirical (i.e., meta-analytic data on the relations
among the theory of planned behavior constructs) and theoretical
information (i.e., moderate positive association between basic
psychological needs and the social-cognitive variables of the
theory of planned behavior) guided the development of Bayesian
priors that were integrated with new data collected from a
sample of young adults. In summary, Bayesian approaches
offer an advance on frequentist approaches when testing the
nomological validity of health behavior theories by providing
the opportunity to test theories based on prior information
including theory and data. Theories can therefore be specified a
priori based on its predictions and available evidence, subjected
to subsequent testing, verified or rejected, and modified and
updated.
GUIDELINES FOR MODEL TESTING
BASED ON NOMOLOGICAL VALIDITY
We advocate that researchers consider nomological validity
when testing the adequacy of social cognitive models aimed
at predicting health behavior and health-related outcomes. We
expect that testing for nomological validity involving networks
of relations among theory variables will encourage researchers
to specify clearly the predictions required for the theory to
be supported, along with associated auxiliary assumptions,
and prevent selective post hoc justification for failed tests
and ‘fit hacking.’ We provide a set of four guidelines for
researchers adopting the nomological approach: (1) Specification.
Clear specification of the proposed effects or hypotheses in
a model consistent with the nomological approach, including
the any auxiliary assumptions on which the predictions are
conditional; (2) Investigation. Identify appropriate tests that
allow confirmation or rejection of the network specified a
priori against observations or data; (3) Interpretation. Make a
definitive decision based on the empirical test without making
post hoc adjustments or judgements that go against the a priori
specification of the network and auxiliary assumptions; and (4)
Replication or reformulation. Use the interpretation in (3) as a
basis for further confirmatory replications to ensure the network
is robust and replicable or, pending a decision to reject the
network, formal respecification of the model based on theory and
the previous test and subject it to further validation on a fresh
body of data (Cronbach and Meehl, 1955). We provide details of
these four guidelines in the next sections.
(1) Specification. Clear a priori specification of the relations
among proposed constructs of a model based on priori
theory and research is essential for a nomological validity
test. The researcher needs to specify clearly the directional
pathways in the network among constructs in the model,
as well as hypothesized effects relating to processes,
including direct, indirect, and reciprocal relations, and
potential moderation effects. In addition, if any effects
are not considered fundamental to the test of the
model, then they should be clearly identified a priori
as exploratory or peripheral. Such a position has been
advocated by numerous researchers aiming to promote
better model specification (Sniehotta et al., 2014; Hagger
and Chatzisarantis, 2016b). It is also important that the
specification of the fundamental effects in the model
are, wherever possible, accompanied by statements of
effect size estimates or a range of potential effect sizes.
This information will prevent acceptance of models when
one or more of the a priori specified pathways are so
small that they are considered trivial from a practical or
theoretical perspective, even when tests of such pathways
surpass criteria for statistical significance. Finally, clear
specification of the auxiliary assumptions expected to affect
predictions (e.g., moderator variables that might magnify,
diminish, or extinguish proposed effects) is required.
A useful means to aid the clarification of the specification
of a nomological network is to plot a path diagram in
which constructs and pathways are represented by ‘boxes’
and ‘arrows.’ Useful resources exist on effective means
to draw diagrams to accurately capture the pathways
and processes of interest. We encourage researchers to
study the conceptual diagrams proposed by Hayes’ (2013),
which provide multiple hypothetical examples to illustrate
patterns of effects in nomological networks. These diagrams
not only have the advantage of guiding the researcher on
how to depict the proposed network, but also directly relate
to the potential analytic procedures that might be adopted
to test the network in empirical data sets.
(2) Investigation. Researchers are encouraged to adopt rigorous
research designs (e.g., longitudinal or experimental
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designs), use measures with sound psychometric
integrity, collect data on suitable samples with adequate
statistical power, and adopt appropriate confirmatory
analytic techniques when testing nomological networks.
Maximizing the quality of evidence to support a network
should be a guiding principle. At this stage the researcher
should also specify the expected size of the effects in
the nomological network and base the selection of the
sample size on those effects. Tools to estimate sample size
and statistical power for complex path analytic models
with indirect effects using Monte Carlo simulations
have recently been made available (Schoemann et al.,
2017). Consistent with the requirement for sound data
and recent advocacy for strong data to test effects in
social psychology (Open Science Collaboration, 2015),
researchers should also aim for stringent alpha levels
and high >0.90 statistical power to control for type I
and type II error rates, respectively. Researchers should
also ensure the adoption of measures with sufficient
reliability and validity to tap constructs of interest in
order to minimize measurement error in tests of model
hypotheses. In the cases of cumulative evidence testing
nomological networks across existing data sets through
path analytic meta-analysis, researchers should clearly
specify inclusion criteria and adopt rigorous consensus
methods to ensure equivalence of measures across studies
included in the synthesis. The researcher should also be
mindful of potential heterogeneity in effect sizes across
studies and to search for possible moderators of effects
within the network.
(3) Interpretation. Tests for nomological validity demand
that the entire network is tested as a whole, and
failure of individual predictions means failed support for
nomological validity of the model. Researchers should
avoid temptations to claim support for the model if a
proposed prediction fundamental to the network is not
supported. Of course, this interpretation must be made
with due consideration of potential mitigating factors
such as auxiliary assumptions and data quality based
on a reasonable falsification criterion (Trafimow, 2012).
Posteriori justification of tests that fail to support proposed
networks undermine scientific progress by making model
development an unstructured, subjective process that lies
outside the bounds of scientific rigor. Trends toward the
pre-registration of study hypotheses, protocols, and analytic
procedures is a useful means to restrict post hoc decision
making (Probst and Hagger, 2015; Jonas and Cesario, 2016).
(4) Replication or reformulation. If researchers interpret
their test as supportive of the nomological validity
of their proposed model, then they should seek to
exactly or conceptually replicate the effects, perhaps
considering varying extraneous conditions relating to
auxiliary assumptions (Trafimow, 2009). Even if the
researcher has been diligent in conducting the research
using measures with sound reliability and validity evidence,
and in an appropriately powered sample that is reasonably
representative of the population of interest, a single
supportive test of nomological validity is insufficient to
provide definitive support. In order to verify the effects
and to ensure that the initial test was not obtained by
chance, replication is advocated (Lindsay, 2015). Over
time cumulative failures to support a model may catalyze
researchers to specify a revised nomological network. The
network should be treated as a ‘new’ model and subjected
to new tests of nomological validity consistent with steps
1 to 3.
These recommendations place the onus on researchers
to adopt a stringent nomological approach when it comes
to testing models. Adopting them will limit researchers
introducing alternative hypotheses after the fact to explain
findings that run contrary to hypotheses and avoid falsification
evasion. Of course, those responsible for determining the
direction of published science and the promulgation of
findings in journals also have a significant role to play.
Journal editors and peer reviewers are also well placed to
demand that research submitted for publication adopts
rigorous tests of nomological validity and provides clear
demarcation of the conditions that lead to the falsification
of predictions. Similarly, professors and teachers have a
responsibility to advocate the nomological approach to ensure
that students are versed in the principles of reasonable
falsifiability as they embark on their fledgling research
careers.
CONCLUSION
Testing the adequacy of psychological models to explain health-
related behavior and outcomes provides an evidence base
for future theory-based behavioral interventions (Glanz and
Bishop, 2010; Hagger et al., 2012; Gourlan et al., 2016).
In this article we have discussed the merits of rigorous
nomological validity tests of models applied in health psychology.
We have argued that such an approach is important to
generate strong supportive evidence for models and minimize
ad hoc posteriori explanations for failed predictions. We
argue that current means to test models tend not to adopt
this strict approach and do not provide a strong basis on
which to decide whether a network has been supported
or falsified. We have provided a set of guidelines for
researchers to promote more effective, fit-for-purpose model
tests using the nomological approach. We also identified
the importance of converging evidence for the nomological
validity of models across multiple tests through path analytic
meta-analysis and the role of Bayesian estimation to provide
greater precision tests of nomological validity based on prior
evidence. Finally, while we have illustrated the imperative of
adopting rigorous nomological validity tests when applying
social cognitive theories in health behavior research, a domain
in which understanding of the antecedents and processes
that lead to behavior is a priority, such tests should also
be advocated in other behavioral domains in which social
cognitive theories have been applied. Our suggested guidelines
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for nomological validity tests should also be adopted in
tests of social cognitive theories applied in educational,
environmental, and prosocial behavioral domains. We encourage
researchers and journal editors to assume responsibility in
ensuring that tests of social cognitive theories in multiple
applied disciplines are subjected to strong tests of nomological
validity.
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